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ARE CERTAIN CREDITORS TOO BIG (OR 
IMPORTANT) TO FAIL? 
INTRODUCTION 
The most recent financial crisis, which produced the worst recession 
since the Great Depression, affected financial markets both in the United 
States and abroad.1 The financial crisis has been attributed to many 
causes—chief among them, the deregulation of the financial markets, 
subprime mortgage lending, and securitization of complex and opaque 
financial products.2 One of the most notable and widely criticized responses 
to the financial crisis was the government-sponsored bailout3 of financial 
institutions.4 In the years preceding the crisis, many financial institutions, 
such as Bear Sterns5 and Lehman Brothers,6 had grown so large and 
interconnected that their collapse would have had a catastrophic effect on 
the U.S. financial markets, thereby coining the phrase “too big to fail” 
(TBTF).7 The federal government viewed current insolvency regimes as an 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See DICK K. NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34742, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 2 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs 
/misc/RL34742.pdf; Martin Neil Baily & Douglas J. Elliott, The US Financial and Economic 
Crisis: Where Does It Stand and Where Do We Go From Here?, BROOKINGS (June 2009), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0615_economic_crisis_baily_elliott/0615
_economic_crisis_baily_elliott.pdf. 
 2. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Statement before 
the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n: Causes of the Recent Financial and Economic Crisis (Sept. 2, 
2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20100902a.pdf 
[hereinafter Causes of the Recent Financial and Economic Crisis]. 
 3. A bailout is a rescue from financial distress. During the recent financial crisis, the Federal 
Reserve implemented a bailout program by using its emergency lending authority under § 13(3) of 
the Federal Reserve Act. AIG is an example of such a bailout program. See Scott G. Alvarez, 
General Counsel, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Testimony before the Cong. 
Oversight Panel: Government Assistance to AIG (May 26, 2010), available at 
http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/alvarez20100526a.pdf; WEBSTER’S NEW 
UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 140 (2d ed. 1983). 
 4. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for 
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 797 (2011).  
 5. Bear Sterns was an investment bank, and a securities and trading brokerage company. The 
company collapsed in 2008 and was subsequently sold in a “fire sale” to JPMorgan in a deal 
facilitated by the Federal Reserve. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Landon Thomas Jr., JPMorgan Acts to 
Buy Ailing Bear Stearns at Huge Discount, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2008/03/16/business/16cnd-bear.html?scp=2&sq=bear%20stearns&st=Search. 
 6. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. was the fourth-largest investment bank in the United 
States before it filed for Chapter 11 protection under the Bankruptcy Code on September 15, 2008. 
The Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy is the largest bankruptcy in the history of the United States, 
involving over 100,000 unsecured creditors and $613 billion in debt. See Sam Mamudi, Lehman 
Folds with Record $613 Billion Debt, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 15, 2008, 10:11 AM) http://www 
.marketwatch.com/story/lehman-folds-with-record-613-billion-debt?siteid=rss; Barclays Buys 
Core Lehman Assets, BBC NEWS, Sept. 17, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business 
/7620306.stm. 
 7. “A too-big-to-fail firm is one whose size, complexity and interconnectedness, and critical 
functions are such that, should the firm go unexpectedly into liquidation, the rest of the financial 
system and the economy would face severe adverse consequences.” Causes of the Recent 
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inadequate response to address the failure of a TBTF financial institution.8 
Consequently, “financial support for [these] compan[ies] sometimes was 
the only viable option . . . to avoid or mitigate serious adverse effects on 
economic conditions and financial stability . . . .”9 In furtherance of this 
solution, Congress established the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP),10 which allowed the Department of the Treasury (the Treasury 
Department) to inject capital into failing institutions and purchase their 
distressed assets.11 
In 2010, in response to the crisis, Congress passed the most sweeping 
financial reform regulation of the past seventy years—the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).12 Dodd-Frank 
was implemented to address the regulatory gaps that exacerbated the 
financial crisis by: imposing stricter regulations on financial institutions, 
regulating particular financial products that were previously unregulated,13 
and creating an adequate system for liquidating TBTF institutions.14 These 
laws were structured in an effort to eliminate systemic risk15 and minimize 
                                                                                                                           
Financial and Economic Crisis, supra note 2, at 20–23; see also Reza Dibadj, Four Key Elements 
To Successful Financial Regulatory Reform, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 377, 389–90 (2010). 
 8. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority 
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 
64,173, 64,174 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380) [hereinafter Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking]. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), Pub. L. N. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3765 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 11. At the request of the Treasury Department, Congress enacted the EESA to effectively bail 
out TBTF institutions. Id. § 5201 et seq.; Greg Hitt, Damian Paletta & Deborah Solomon, 
Lawmakers Battle Over Rescue Plan, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB122200573768460503.html. The EESA allowed the Treasury Department to use up to $700 
billion to inject capital into failing institutions and purchase their distressed assets through TARP. 
EESA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211–5241. 
 12. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 13. Dodd-Frank will now regulate over-the-counter derivatives (once a primarily unregulated 
financial market), which will be enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Regulatory Practice Letter, KPMG, Dodd-Frank 
Act: Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives (Title VII) (Aug. 10, 2010), available at 
http://www.us.kpmg.com/microsite/RegulatoryPractice/2010/rpl-1013-otc-derivatives.pdf. 
 14. See Dodd-Frank Act § 206, 124 Stat. 1459 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5386); U.S. S. COMM. 
ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2010), available at http://banking.senate.gov 
/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf.  
 15. Although there is no single definition for systemic risk, Steven L. Schwarcz states, 
  A common factor in the various definitions of systemic risk is that a trigger event, 
such as an economic shock or institutional failure, causes a chain of bad economic 
consequences—sometimes referred to as a domino effect. . . .  
. . . . 
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moral hazard16 in an orderly and transparent manner.17 Dodd-Frank, 
specifically Title II, created the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA),18 
which grants the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)19 the 
authority to act as receiver20 and wind down bank holding companies21 and 
nonbank financial companies,22 which pose a significant risk.23 This is to 
ensure that creditors and shareholders, and not the U.S. taxpayers, will 
sustain the loss of the financial company.24 To address the widespread 
public contempt over the bailouts, Title II also prohibits the FDIC from 
taking an equity interest in or becoming a shareholder of a failing financial 
company.25 
The OLA is a hybrid model26 of two existing insolvency regimes—the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA)27 and the Bankruptcy Code (the 
                                                                                                                           
  The classic example of systemic risk in this context is a “bank run,” in which the 
inability of a bank to satisfy withdrawal-demands causes its failure, in turn causing 
other banks or their creditors to fail. 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 196, 198–99 (2008). As such, the federal 
government anticipated that if complex financial institutions failed, U.S. financial markets could 
experience catastrophic harm. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,174 
(proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380). 
 16. Moral hazard results when a party who is protected from risk (i.e., a bailout recipient) fails 
to take the same precautions as a party who is not protected under the bailout regime. Kenneth 
Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 485 (2010).  
 17. See Dodd-Frank Act § 204, 124 Stat. 1454 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384); U.S. S. COMM. 
ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2010), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public 
/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf.  
 18. Dodd-Frank Act § 204(a), 124 Stat. 1454 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384).  
 19. The FDIC is an independent federal agency that monitors and provides insurance for bank 
and thrift institutions’ deposits to limit the adverse impact that institutional failure would have on 
the U.S. economy. FDIC, Who is the FDIC? (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.fdic.gov/about 
/learn/symbol/.  
 20. The FDIC, as receiver, has the power to liquidate a financial company’s assets in a manner 
it deems appropriate. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a), 124 Stat. 1460 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390). 
 21. A bank holding company includes a company which has control over a bank, or a company 
that has control over another company that is or may become a bank holding company. 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1841(a)(1) (2006); Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1391 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5311). 
 22. A nonbank financial company has been defined as a U.S. or foreign nonbank financial 
company that is “predominantly engaged in financial activities.” Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(4), 124 
Stat. 1391 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5311). This includes companies in which 85 percent of its 
annual gross revenues or consolidated assets are derived from financial activities. Id. § 102(a)(6). 
 23. Significant risk institutions are nonbank financial companies that the Board of Governors 
determines will pose a systemic risk to the financial markets. Id. §§ 102(a)(7), 113(a).  
 24. Id. § 204(a).  
 25. Id. § 206(6). See also Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Statement before 
the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n: Systemically Important Institutions and the Issue of “Too Big to 
Fail” (Sept. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Systemically Important Institutions]. 
 26. Jenna Greene, FDIC’s New Power to Dissolve Companies Raises Concerns, NAT’L L.J. 
(ONLINE) (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202471686189 [hereinafter 
FDIC’s New Power]. 
 27. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 et seq. (2006).  
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Code).28 Under the FDIA, the FDIC has similar authority as receiver to 
wind down failing depository institutions.29 Analogous provisions of the 
Code, such as preferential transfers and fraudulent conveyances, were also 
included in order to supplement and clarify the authority of the FDIC.30 
Under the OLA, the FDIC is granted wide discretion as receiver to 
carry out Title II’s objectives—the most important being, mitigating 
systemic risk and moral hazard. This discretion includes the ability to pay 
certain unsecured creditors before others that are similarly situated, which 
has raised substantial concern.31 Although concern may be warranted, the 
ability to treat similarly situated creditors differently is not a novel idea.32 In 
fact, it is a controversial principle, known as the doctrine of necessity.33 
The doctrine of necessity is a common law rule that allows a debtor to 
pay certain pre-petition unsecured claims before others that would normally 
be subject to a distribution pursuant to § 507 of the Code,34 or a 
confirmation plan in a Chapter 11 reorganization case.35 In some instances, 
the payments of certain unsecured claims are allowed if the creditor is 
deemed to be a “critical vendor.”36 The rationale for payment has been that 
paying certain critical vendors will allow the business to continue, thereby 
benefitting all creditors by maximizing the value of assets.37 Courts are split 
as to the application and use of the doctrine because of the potential for 
abuse of judicial discretion and the possibility that select creditors’ 
distributions will be altered arbitrarily.38  
In order to avoid controversial critical vendor issues and to create a 
more transparent system, the FDIC promulgated a rule, which clarified how 
it intends to exercise its authority regarding additional payments (the Final 
                                                                                                                           
 28. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2006); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 
64,174–75 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380). 
 29. 12 U.S.C. § 1822. 
 30. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,175 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
380). 
 31. See id.; FDIC’s New Power, supra note 26; Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,  
§ 210(b)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1476 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (2010)). 
 32. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 175–176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing 
Miltenberger v. Logansport, C. & S.W. R. Co., 106 U.S. 286 (1882)). 
 33. See id.; Miltenberger, 106 U.S. 286; Alan N. Resnick, The Future of the Doctrine of 
Necessity and Critical-Vendor Payments in Chapter 11 Cases, 47 B.C. L. REV. 183, 187–88 
(2005). 
 34. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2006). 
 35. Resnick, supra note 33, at 183. 
 36. Critical vendors offer a “unique product or special relationship with the debtor” that makes 
them indispensible in order to maximize the value of the assets. Therefore, pre-petition payments 
are permitted to maintain the business relationship between vendor and debtor, notwithstanding 
the adequate stay of § 362. Lynn P. Harrison, III & James V. Drew, First Day Orders: A Survey of 
Critical Vendor Motions and Recent Developments, in BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATIONS: 
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 2011, at 341 (PLI On Demand Web Program Ser. No. 28454) (2009). 
 37. See Resnick, supra note 33, at 185–86. 
 38. See Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and Its 
Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 27–37 (1989); Resnick, supra note 33, at 189–203. 
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Rule).39 Although the Final Rule elucidated the FDIC’s treatment toward 
unsecured creditors, it was primarily directed at long-term creditors and 
failed to address short-term creditors. The FDIC’s decision to omit short-
term creditors from the Final Rule indicates that certain creditors may be 
too big or important to fail. This note does not dispute the fact that under 
certain circumstances, when time is of the essence, it may be necessary to 
treat certain creditors more favorably than others in order to limit systemic 
risk to the financial markets. The reduction of systemic risk, however, can 
still be achieved while incorporating other important goals of Title II as 
well. Thus, the purpose of this note is to offer a standard by which the FDIC 
should determine whether a short-term creditor is necessary to the failing 
financial company. This standard would have the effect of promoting 
transparency within a newly created liquidation regime, minimizing moral 
hazard among short-term creditors, maximizing the assets of the failing 
financial company, harmonizing the OLA with existing insolvency regimes, 
and maintaining FDIC flexibility. 
Part I will describe the FDIC’s Final Rule and the aspects of Title II 
that it sought to clarify. Part II will explain the origins of the doctrine of 
necessity and analyze the various approaches taken by courts today. Part III 
will explain the rationale behind the creation of the OLA compared to other 
alternatives, and its mandated and overarching objectives. Part IV will 
critique the FDIC’s decision to omit short-term creditors from the Final 
Rule. Finally, Part V will recommend that the FDIC adopt a clear standard 
by which it could determine a critical short-term creditor, which would 
create a more transparent and efficient insolvency regime. 
I. SECTION 210 AND THE FDIC’S FINAL RULE 
Dodd-Frank, although over 800 pages in length, operates more as a 
skeletal framework than a definitive set of rules.40 A majority of the 
legislation grants authority to the various governmental agencies to create 
rules and regulations as each agency sees fit.41 Specifically, § 209 of Title II 
authorizes the FDIC, in consultation with the Financial Stability Oversight 
                                                                                                                           
 39. The Final Rule was adopted after the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and an Interim Rule. 
Both solicited comments and suggestions from various business organizations and private parties. 
Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,626 (July 15, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 380.27) [hereinafter Final Rule]. See also Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4,207 (proposed Jan. 
25, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380) [hereinafter Interim Rule]; Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).  
 40. David S. Huntington, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation and Dodd-Frank, 
BLOOMBERG LAW SEMINAR (Nov. 10, 2010). 
 41. See Ronald D. Orol, Fed: No Controversy on Dodd-Frank Rules, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 
30, 2010, 1:01 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/oversight-panel-to-eye-risky-financial-
firms-2010-09-30 (noting that the Federal Reserve must write more than fifty rules on Dodd-
Frank, while the SEC must write more than 100).  
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Council (FSOC),42 to promulgate rules that both agencies determine are 
necessary or appropriate for an efficient liquidation.43 In addition, these 
rules seek to complement current insolvency regimes that would otherwise 
apply absent the OLA.44 The objective of this delegation is to “provide 
guidance on certain key issues in order to provide clarity and certainty to 
the financial industry” as well as comply with Title II’s “mandate of 
transparency” during the receivership process.45 Following these guidelines, 
the FDIC issued the Final Rule in July 2011, which clarified how the FDIC 
would exercise its discretionary authority regarding additional payments to 
unsecured creditors.46 
The authority to make additional payments and treat creditors of the 
same class differently was delegated to the FDIC under § 210(b)(4) of 
Dodd-Frank. This authority, if exercised, would have the effect of altering 
the priority structure,47 which mandates the payment distributions of 
unsecured claims.48 Many commentators have criticized the implementation 
of this authority because it grants the FDIC too much discretion, and as a 
consequence, market participants will have no way to predict how the FDIC 
will act.49 Thus, the FDIC has clarified how it intends to implement its 
discretion. The Final Rule excludes certain creditors that the FDIC has 
determined should not receive additional payment because they are not 
necessary to maximize the value of the failing company’s assets.50 The four 
categories of creditors that have been excluded are: “[h]olders of long-term 
senior debt who have a claim entitled to priority of payment at the level”51 
                                                                                                                           
 42. FSOC was created under Dodd-Frank, and is responsible for detecting and responding to 
systemic threats to the U.S. financial system, while promoting market discipline. Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEPT. OF TREAS., http://www.treas.gov/FSOC (last visited Oct. 
6, 2011).  
 43. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 209, 124 Stat. 1376, 1460 (2010) (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 5389 (2010)). 
 44. Id.  
 45. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,173, 64,177 (proposed Oct. 19, 
2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380). 
 46. Id. at 64,181; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,626 (July 15, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
380.27). 
 47. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1475 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390). 
 48. The priorities set forth under § 210(b)(1) of Dodd-Frank define the order in which 
unsecured claims are paid to each creditor class. The ability to authorize payment of certain 
unsecured claims over others would alter mandated priorities and act as an exception to the rule. 
Id. § 210(b)(1), (4). 
 49. See, e.g., Letter from Comm. on Capital Mkts. Reg. to Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y 
(Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/2010.11.15_FDIC_letter.pdf. 
 50. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,177 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
380). 
 51. Long-term senior debt has been defined as  
debt issued by the covered financial company to bondholders or other creditors that has 
a term of more than 360 days. It does not include partially funded, revolving or other 
open lines of credit that are necessary to continuing operations essential to the 
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of general or senior liability; “[h]olders of subordinated debt” to general 
creditors;52 “[s]hareholders, members, general partners, limited partners, or 
other persons”;53 and “[o]ther holders of claims” of general or senior 
liability.54 The Final Rule was adopted to put these creditors on notice that 
they “will not receive additional payments compared to other general 
creditors . . . .”55 These categories can be subject to change, however, if by a 
vote of its Board of Directors, the FDIC determines that additional 
payments are needed.56 
Although the Final Rule aimed to clarify the exercise of the FDIC’s 
discretion regarding additional payments, it omitted an important class of 
creditors. The Final Rule failed to include any standard or framework in 
which the FDIC will determine how the creditors that are not per se 
excluded (i.e., short-term creditors) will be deemed necessary to the 
liquidation. As a result, this gap poses the same question that has troubled 
courts when considering whether to apply the doctrine of necessity: how 
does one determine a creditor’s necessity?57 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY 
Granting the FDIC authority to make additional payments and 
circumvent the priority scheme is not a novel concept. In bankruptcy, it is 
known as the doctrine of necessity. The doctrine of necessity recognizes 
that judicial authority exists to allow a debtor to pay certain pre-petition 
unsecured creditors because payment is essential to the debtor’s continued 
operation.58 These creditors are also known as “critical vendors” because 
they generally have an unparalleled relationship with the debtor that makes 
them indispensible in order to maximize the value of the assets.59 The 
doctrine is quite controversial and is exercised differently depending on the 
jurisdiction.60 In order to understand the implications of the FDIC’s 
favorable treatment of certain creditors, it is necessary to briefly review the 
                                                                                                                           
receivership or any bridge financial company, nor to any contracts to extend credit 
enforced by the receiver under 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(13)(D).  
Id. at 64,181; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,644 (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380.27). 
 52. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
380); Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,644 (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380.27).  
 53. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
380); Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,644 (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380.27). 
 54. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
380); Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,644 (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380.27). 
 55. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,177 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
380). 
 56. Id. at 64,181; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,644 (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380.27). 
 57. See Joseph Gilday, “Critical” Error: Why Essential Vendor Payments Violate the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 411, 419 (2003). 
 58. See Resnick, supra note 33, at 183–84. 
 59. See Harrison & Drew, supra note 36, at 341. 
 60. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 38, at 27–37; Resnick, supra note 33, at 189–203. 
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common law origins of the doctrine of necessity and its disparate 
application by courts today. 
A. RAILROADS AND BEYOND: COMMON LAW ORIGINS OF THE 
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY 
The doctrine of necessity was originally set forth in Miltenberger v. 
Logansport Railway in 1882. In Miltenberger, the Supreme Court allowed 
the payment of certain pre-receivership claims against the debtor-railroad in 
order to avert threatened supply and exchange stoppages.61 The Supreme 
Court held “that a court has the authority to grant an equity receiver 
discretion to pay preexisting debts ‘necessary and indispensible’ to the 
continued operation of the business as part of the receiver’s general duty to 
protect and preserve property under their charge.”62 The “Necessity of 
Payment Rule,” as it became known, quickly cemented itself in the railroad 
context and was routinely applied.63 
The first extension beyond the railroad context where a court allowed 
the debtor to pay pre-petition debts was in Dudley v. Mealey.64 In Dudley, 
however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not justify its decision on 
the Necessity of Payment Rule or Miltenberger, but rather on the “Six 
Months Rule.”65 The court allowed a debtor-hotel to pay certain pre-
receivership suppliers, whose debts arose six months before the petition 
date, and justified the payment by the benefit to all creditors.66 The Second 
Circuit articulated that in order to protect the secured creditors, it might be 
necessary to pay unsecured creditors in order to continue the relationship.67 
Although the doctrine of necessity (or its predecessor, the Necessity of 
Payment Rule) was never mentioned in Dudley, courts still use the decision 
as justification to permit payment of pre-petition claims in order to protect 
creditors’ interests and better facilitate reorganization outside the railroad 
context.68 
                                                                                                                           
 61. Miltenberger v. Logansport, C. & S.W. R. Co., 106 U.S. 286, 311–12 (1882). 
 62. Jeffrey N. Pomerantz, The Bare Necessities of Critical Vendor Motions-It’s a Jungle Out 
There, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 73 (2004) (citing Miltenberger, 106 U.S. 286).  
 63. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 38, at 3. 
 64. Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1945); see generally Pomerantz, supra note 62; 
Resnick, supra note 33, at 188. 
 65. The Six Months Rule granted administrative priority status to certain expenses within six 
months of receiver appointment. The rule was later codified in § 77(b) of the Bankruptcy Act and 
later in § 1171(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. See Gilday, supra note 57, at 426–27; Pomerantz, 
supra note 62; 11 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (2006). 
 66. Dudley, 147 F.2d at 271. 
 67. Id.  
 68. See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 1021, 1023 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991); Resnick, supra note 33, at 188. 
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B. HOW THE DOCTRINE IS APPLIED TODAY: THREE APPROACHES 
1. Liberal Application  
The tendency of courts to utilize the doctrine of necessity varies 
drastically by jurisdiction.69 Courts that have been more inclined to grant 
critical vendor motions for the payment of pre-petition claims have been 
referred to as “debtor friendly.”70 Debtor-friendly courts include the Second 
and Third Circuits, which notably encompass the Southern District of New 
York and the District of Delaware.71 Despite the presence of the word 
“necessity” in the name of the doctrine, debtor-friendly courts grant critical 
vendor motions quite frequently.72 The grant of critical vendor pre-petition 
claims73 is justified by its tendency to maximize the value of the business, 
which increases the total assets and income that will be distributed to all 
creditors. 
Some courts have derived their authority from the equitable power of  
§ 105(a), which states “the court may issue any order, process, or judgment 
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title[]” in 
conjunction with the doctrine of necessity.74 These courts have interpreted  
§ 105(a) very broadly. They reason that payment of pre-petition claims is 
warranted because it is necessary and consistent with the general policy 
                                                                                                                           
 69. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 38, at 27–37; Resnick, supra note 33, at 189–203. 
 70. See, e.g., In re Just For Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821 (D. Del. 1999); Mich. Bureau of Workers 
Disability Comp. v. Chateaugay Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 80 B.R. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In 
re Wehrenberg, Inc., 260 B.R. 468 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2001); see also Bruce H. White, William L. 
Medfort & Patton Boggs, The Doctrine of Necessity and Critical Trade Vendors: The 
Impracticality of Maintaining Post-Petition Business Relations in Mega-Cases, 21 AM. BANKR. 
INST. J. 24, 24 (2002). 
 71. See, e.g., In re Ionosphere, 98 B.R. at 179 (approving the debtor’s payment of pre-petition 
salaries and benefits to active employees); In re Lehigh & New Eng. Ry. Co., 657 F.2d 570, 581 
(3d Cir. 1981) (stating that payment of a claim arising before reorganization is authorized if it is 
“essential to the continued operation of the [debtor]”); In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 171 B.R. 
189, 192 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994) (noting that in the Third Circuit, a debtor may pay pre-petition 
creditors “in advance of a confirmed plan,” where such payments are “essential to the continued 
operation of the [debtor’s] business”); In re Fin. News Network, Inc., 134 B.R. 732, 735–36 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (observing that “[t]he ‘doctrine of necessity’ stands for the principle that a 
bankruptcy court may allow pre-plan payments of prepetition obligations where such payments 
are critical to the debtor’s reorganization”). See also In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543, 
544 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001); In re Just For Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. at 821; In re Chateaugay Corp., 
80 B.R. at 279; In re United Am., Inc., 327 B.R. 776, 781 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005); In re NVR 
L.P., 147 B.R. 126, 127 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992). 
 72. See White, Medfort & Boggs, supra note 70, at 24; Harrison & Drew, supra note 36, at 
348.  
 73. Critical vendor motions are usually made with the other first day motions, in which a 
debtor will petition the bankruptcy court to allow certain pre-petition claims to be paid. JEFFREY 
T. FERRIELL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 725–26 (2d ed. 2007). 
 74. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006); White, Medfort & Boggs, supra note 70, at 24. See 
generally In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821; In re Wehrenberg, 260 B.R. 468. 
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goals of bankruptcy, such as debtor rehabilitation,75 preservation of the 
going-concern value,76 and maximization of value of the debtor.77 
Other courts have held that applying the doctrine under § 105(a) alone 
is not sufficient to support critical vendor motions, and consequently, have 
derived their powers from other provisions of the Code. The bankruptcy 
court in In re Payless Cashways found support for pre-petition payments 
under both §§ 364(b) and 549 of the Code.78 The court granted the debtor 
the authority to pay pre-petition claims of its lumber suppliers on the basis 
that they were “critical to the continued operation of the debtor . . . .”79 The 
court affirmed that § 364(b) “grants the Court broad authority, at the outset 
of a case, to approve borrowing arrangements that are found to be in the 
best interests of the debtor, its estate, and its creditors.”80 The Payless court 
went on to recognize that it should follow the priorities established in § 507 
of the Code; however, the Code permits the court “some limited power to 
authorize preferential treatment to certain creditors.”81 Since the debtor 
failed to secure post-petition financing, the court found that the granting of 
preferential treatment was the only way vendors who were critical to the 
debtor’s restructuring would continue to supply goods.82 
In addition, other courts have suggested that pre-petition payments may 
be justified under § 363(b) of the Code, which allows the trustee to “use, 
sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the 
estate” of the debtor.83 Section 363(b) gives the court the authority and 
flexibility to craft solutions in various situations, including the payment for 
certain pre-petition claims.84 
Liberally granting critical vendor motions is not without its drawbacks. 
Payment of pre-petition claims invariably will reduce the cash reserves of 
the debtor. Therefore, if a company cannot adequately reorganize and is 
                                                                                                                           
 75. In re Wehrenberg, 260 B.R. at 469. 
 76. The going-concern value means that a business will continue to operate for the foreseeable 
future and will be able to realize assets and discharge liabilities in the normal course of operations. 
This concept occurs under the Code when the value of the business’s assets exceeds the value the 
business would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. The ultimate goal is that business will continue 
to operate in order to preserve the going concern. See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does 
Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-
First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 164–66 (2004). 
 77. In re Wehrenberg, 260 B.R. at 469. 
 78. In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543, 546–47 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001).  
 79. Id. at 544.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 546. Under the Code, a trustee may avoid the transfer of property of the estate that 
occurs post-petition. 11 U.S.C. § 549 (2006). 
 82. In re Payless, 268 B.R. at 547. 
 83. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). See also In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 175, 175 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Kmart Corp., 359 
F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004) (leaving open the possibility that pre-petition payments may be 
allowed under § 363(b)(1), which does the least damage to the Code’s priorities). 
 84. In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1069; In re Ionosphere, 98 B.R. at 175. 
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forced to liquidate, less cash, if any, will be available for distribution to the 
secured and unsecured creditors. Furthermore, it is typically the debtor that 
petitions the court to grant their critical vendor motions, which has elicited 
criticism in that the debtor will select certain creditors based on favoritism, 
and not necessity. If creditors believe that they will be paid so long as the 
debtor petitions the court, creditors will be less inclined to take adequate 
precautions. Thus, the consequential lack of monitoring risk exposure will 
increase moral hazard among creditors. 
2. Prohibition of the Doctrine 
In contrast to the liberal application, some courts reject or drastically 
limit the use of the doctrine of necessity.85 These courts find that the 
doctrine contradicts the overarching bankruptcy principle that creditors of 
the same class are not to be treated dissimilarly.86 Under the Code, 
unsecured claims are paid in accordance with their respective priority 
position under § 507, and claims that are at the same priority level are 
entitled to the same treatment.87 Thus, the doctrine of necessity operates as 
an exception to the general claims priority rule.88 Critics of the doctrine’s 
use argue that the Code is clear on the types of claims that are entitled to a 
certain status in the priority scheme. They also argue that judges do not 
have “free-floating discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with 
[their] personal views of justice and fairness . . . .”89 The importance of 
strictly adhering to § 507 is to create a transparent and predictable system 
for creditors that decide to engage in or continue business with the debtor.90 
Some courts also refuse to apply the doctrine because it is difficult for 
judges to determine which creditors are necessary.91 Critical vendor 
motions typically accompany all other emergency requests for payment on 
the first day the petition is filed.92 These courts argue that the “doomsday 
scenario”93 described by debtors in these motions and the expedited first 
day procedure prompt debtor-friendly courts94 to grant motions without an 
                                                                                                                           
 85. See Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 1987); 
In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 791 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 86. See In re Chi., 791 F.2d at 528. 
 87. 11 U.S.C. § 507. See also Jo Ann J. Brighton, The Doctrine of Necessity: Is it Really 
Necessary?, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 107, 108 (2000); Bruce S. Nathan, Critical Vendors: 
Elevating the Low-Priority Unsecured Claims of Pre-Petition Trade Creditors, 21 AM. BANKR. 
INST. J. 14, 14 (2002). 
 88. Nathan, supra note 87, at 14. 
 89. See In re Chi., 791 F.2d at 528. 
 90. See Resnick, supra note 33, at 184.  
 91. See Harrison & Drew, supra note 36, at 344–46. 
 92. FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 73, at 725–26. 
 93. See Gilday, supra note 57, at 416. 
 94. See, e.g., In re Just For Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821 (D. Del. 1999); Mich. Bureau of Workers 
Disability Comp. v. Chateaugay Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 80 B.R. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In 
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in-depth analysis of whether the creditors are in fact essential to the health 
of the debtor.95 
Furthermore, granting critical vendor motions may not give adequate 
notice of pre-petition payment to the debtor’s other creditors.96 Generally, 
all interested parties in a bankruptcy proceeding will receive notice, which 
affords them an opportunity to object.97 Yet granting certain vendor 
motions on the first day, before a hearing, may violate a creditor’s right to 
due process.98 
Although a bright-line rule rejecting the doctrine provides clarity to the 
bankruptcy proceedings, the outright denial of pre-petition payments is not 
without its disadvantages. Prohibiting pre-petition payments could prevent 
the company from continuing its operations, thereby reducing the total 
value of the assets or forcing a “fire sale” of the assets. Furthermore, the 
prohibition of payment could have systemic consequences. For example, 
certain creditors, most likely trade creditors, will face financial difficulties 
and possibly fail if pre-petition payment is not made.99 One reason for 
failure is that the debtor could be the largest account for the trade vendor 
and thus, if the vendor is not paid, a majority of its revenue will be lost.100 
In addition, certain debtors not only require pre-petition payments to 
sustain their business, but also post-petition financing or debtor-in-
possession (DIP) financing.101 Typically, if a debtor files for a Chapter 11 
reorganization, it secures DIP financing in order to make post-petition 
payments and continues running the business. A majority of the time, the 
creditors that extend DIP financing are the same unsecured creditors that 
are seeking pre-petition payment. Eliminating the doctrine could prevent 
unsecured creditors from financing the post-petition debt altogether, forcing 
the debtor into a liquidation proceeding. This in turn may inhibit the 
realization of full asset value. The prohibition of the doctrine by these 
courts is an overly conservative restriction to the exercise of judicial 
discretion, which may create unnecessary and deleterious consequences to 
all creditors. 
                                                                                                                           
re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002); In re Wehrenberg, Inc., 260 B.R. 468 
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2001); see also White, Medfort & Boggs, supra note 70, at 24.  
 95. See Gilday, supra note 57, at 419. 
 96. See Brighton, supra note 87, at 115. 
 97. See id.  
 98. See id.; Harrison & Drew, supra note 36, at 337.  
 99. See Gilday, supra note 57, at 420. 
 100. See id.; In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 499–500 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002). 
 101. DIP financing under Chapter 11 of the Code allows debtors of a failing company access to 
secure proceeds, enabling the continuation of the business. To entice creditors to lend to a 
distressed company, DIP financing lenders receive super-priority status over all other debt, and 
equity claims. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006). 
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3. Striking the Correct Balance 
Contrary to the all-or-nothing approaches used by some courts, other 
courts have attempted to strike a balance by implementing tests for 
determining such critical vendors.102 These courts have recognized the need 
for certain pre-petition payments, but have also exercised caution in 
determining which claims should receive critical vendor status. 
One of the most prominent cases where the court correctly balanced 
critical vendor motions was In re Kmart Corp.103 In Kmart, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of orders that allowed the debtor, 
Kmart, to pay pre-petition claims of certain alleged critical vendors and 
suppliers before confirmation of the debtor’s Chapter 11 plan of 
reorganization.104 It did not, however, affirm the district court’s reasoning 
or the per se prohibition of critical vendor motions in general.105 
In the initial bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy court had granted 
pre-petition payments, which totaled approximately $300 million to 2,330 
critical vendors, while approximately 2,000 other vendors were deemed not 
critical, and over 43,000 additional unsecured creditors were denied any 
pre-petition payment.106 The district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s 
order authorizing payment, “conclud[ing] that neither § 105(a) nor a ‘doc-
trine of necessity’ supports the orders.”107 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit 
articulated that the bankruptcy court failed to explain or justify any basis for 
granting the critical vendor motions.108 In order to prove the vendor was 
necessary, the bankruptcy court should have shown that disfavored credi-
tors would have received more in a reorganization than in a liquidation, and 
“that the supposedly critical vendors would have ceased deliveries if old 
debts were left unpaid . . . .”109 The Seventh Circuit alluded to alternative 
options that were available to Kmart, which the bankruptcy court failed to 
address.110 For instance, the bankruptcy court neglected the option of using 
a letter of credit to assure payment, failed to find that vendors would dis-
continue business with Kmart absent payment, failed to determine that dis-
similar treatment of unsecured creditors was necessary for reorganization, 
and failed to show that disfavored creditors were in at least the same posi-
tion but for the orders.111 In addition, the Seventh Circuit noted that some 
creditors should have been excluded from pre-petition payment because 
                                                                                                                           
 102. See, e.g., In re CoServ, 273 B.R. 487; In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 103. See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866. 
 104. See id. at 867.  
 105. The court left open the possibility of a critical vendor motion under § 363(b)(1) by 
refusing to address the issue since this particular order was unsound for its application. See id. at 
872. 
 106. See id. at 869.  
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. at 867.  
 109. Id. at 873.  
 110. Id. at 873–74.  
 111. Id.  
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they were already contractually obligated112 to continue doing business with 
the debtor company; thus, pre-petition payment was unnecessary.113 
Although the Seventh Circuit called the doctrine of necessity “just a 
fancy name for a power to depart from the Code[,]” it did not reject the 
principle of pre-petition payment of critical vendors entirely.114 The court 
left open the possibility of a pre-petition payment to a critical vendor under 
§ 363(b)(1) of the Code.115 It considered § 363(b)(1) to be the most 
promising justification for granting critical vendor orders, reasoning that the 
payment of pre-petition debt was warranted “in order to keep ‘critical’ 
supplies flowing” and “is a use of property other than in the ordinary course 
of [business] . . . .”116 
The Seventh Circuit articulated a balance between a “per se 
prohibition” and a frequently exercised grant of pre-petition payments made 
to critical vendors.117 The Kmart standard requires that unsecured creditor 
claims not be paid unless it is clear that the creditor will otherwise 
discontinue its business relations with the debtor, which would in turn have 
a detrimental effect on all creditors. In addition, all other alternatives should 
be carefully analyzed before granting the motion. The unfortunate 
consequence of this approach is that it will reward those who refuse to 
cooperate by paying them first. It appears that under Kmart, noncooperative 
creditors are rewarded at the expense of cooperative creditors. 
Another court has applied similar reasoning and a strict analysis 
regarding critical vendors as the Seventh Circuit in Kmart.118 The 
bankruptcy court in In re CoServ, L.L.C. denied the debtor’s motion with 
respect to five critical vendors and granted only two.119 The court found 
that, in most cases, the alleged critical vendors could be replaced with little 
or no harm to the debtor’s going concern. The court held that, in order to 
make critical vendor payments, the debtor must show by a preponderance of 
evidence that: (1) “it must be critical that the debtor deal with the 
claimant”;120 (2) “unless it deals with the claimant, the debtor risks the 
possibility of harm, or, alternatively, loss of economic advantage to the 
estate or the debtor’s going-concern value, which is disproportionate to the 
                                                                                                                           
 112. The automatic stay provision under the Code prohibits vendors with contract obligations 
from breaching by nonperformance due to the debtor’s failure to pay pre-petition debts. An 
automatic stay is an operation of law in that it automatically prevents all creditors from receiving 
payment from the debtor until a reorganization plan has been confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006); 
In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873. 
 113. In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873. 
 114. Id. at 871.  
 115. Id. at 872.  
 116. Id.  
 117. See Harrison & Drew, supra note 36, at 348. 
 118. See, e.g., In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002). 
 119. Id. at 499–501.  
 120. Id. at 498.  
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amount of the claimant’s prepetition claim”;121 and (3) “there is no practical 
or legal alternative by which the debtor can deal with the claimant other 
than by payment of the claim.”122 The CoServ court further recognized that 
there may be legal remedies available to the debtor that do not require pre-
petition payment, but nonetheless alleviate creditors’ concerns.123 
Both the CoServ and Kmart courts have established clear factors that 
should be addressed when establishing critical vendor status, which will 
strike a correct balance between actual necessity and liberal discretion in 
granting critical vendor motions. This approach allows for some flexibility 
of the courts discretionary authority, but is not an invitation for abuse by 
debtors and creditors. 
III. DODD-FRANK’S ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY 
Under Title II of Dodd-Frank, the FDIC was granted authority to treat 
similarly situated creditors differently, so long as it was in furtherance of 
the OLA’s objectives. Some of these objectives are specifically mandated 
by Title II, and generally by Dodd-Frank. In order to adhere to these 
objectives, the FDIC clarified how it intended to treat certain creditors as 
expressed in the Final Rule.124 Nevertheless, the FDIC’s failure to set a 
standard, for other creditors that were not per se excluded, does not 
adequately adhere to the OLA’s mandated objectives as effectively as it 
could. Thus, this note proposes a clear standard to address other categories 
of creditors not encompassed by the Final Rule, which will accomplish 
OLA’s objectives more effectively. To fully understand this note’s 
proposal, a brief discussion of the creation of the OLA and its objectives is 
necessary. 
A. RATIONALE FOR THE ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY 
The rationale behind the creation of the OLA was to put in place the 
legal mechanisms that were not available before the crisis occurred—
namely, the ability of the federal government to wind down bank holding 
companies and nonbank financial companies.125 Before the creation of the 
OLA under Dodd-Frank, when a bank holding company or nonbank 
financial company became insolvent, the only available option was to file 
for protection under the Code as either a liquidation proceeding under 
                                                                                                                           
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 499. 
 124. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 206, 124 Stat. 1376, 1459 (2010) (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 5386 (2010)); Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,626 (July 15, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
380.27). 
 125. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,174 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to 
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380). 
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Chapter 7,126 or a reorganization under Chapter 11.127 Opponents of the 
Code, including the Treasury Department, however, argued that the 
bankruptcy system could not adequately liquidate these large financial 
companies.128 
The federal government and other commentators have suggested that 
the bankruptcy process: is not quick enough, which results in loss of asset 
value; lacks competent bankruptcy judges that can handle liquidating a 
complex financial company; could potentially cause “rapid runs on short-
term financial instruments” leading to “‘fire sales’ of assets” when the 
petition is filed; and most importantly, “has neither the goals nor the 
mechanisms to take externalities such as effects on outside parties or the 
financial system into account.”129 In support of the position that the Code 
was an inefficient way to handle the liquidation of these large financial 
companies, critics point to deleterious effects that occurred subsequent to 
the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers.130 
Contrary to previous measures taken by the federal government to 
prevent failure, such as injecting capital, as they did with Bear Sterns, the 
federal government let Lehman Brothers fail.131 Lehman Brothers filed for 
Chapter 11 protection on September 15, 2008, creating the largest 
bankruptcy in U.S. history.132 The events that took place after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers were nothing short of earth-shattering.133 The credit 
market froze in the United States, banks halted lending, consumer and car 
loans were impossible to obtain, and businesses could not obtain credit to 
meet employee payrolls.134 As a consequence, there was a 6 percent decline 
                                                                                                                           
 126. 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (2006).  
 127. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.; see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. at 64,174 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380); see generally Systemically Important Institutions, supra note 
25. 
 128. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Testimony before 
the Comm. Fin. Servs.: Lessons from the Failure of Lehman Brothers (Apr. 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20100420a.htm. 
 129. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STUDY ON THE RESOLUTION OF 
FINANCIAL COMPANIES UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 7 (2011) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter 
STUDY UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE]. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Sorkin & Thomas, supra note 5.  
 132. See The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Under the Dodd-Frank 
Act, 5 FDIC QUARTERLY 1, 1 (2011) [hereinafter Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers]. 
 133. The Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing has been noted as “one of the signal events of the 
financial crisis.” In addition, the Dow Jones declined over 500 points, which was the largest 
single-day drop since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, and credit markets showed distress. 
See id.; Alex Berenson, Wall St.’s Turmoil Sends Stocks Reeling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/business/worldbusiness/16markets.html?hp; Simon 
Kennedy, Greg Morcroft & Robert Schroeder, Lehman Failure, AIG Struggle Drive Financials 
Lower, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 15, 2008, 4:48 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/Story 
/story/print?guid=8E886D48-E3C7-4CE2-95F4-7099CE1A49DB. 
 134. Matthew Jaffe, Lessons to Be Learned One Year After Lehman Brothers Collapse Roiled 
the World, ABC NEWS (Sept. 14, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/lessons-learned-year-
financial-crisis-began/story?id=8563814; Fareed Zakaria, A Lonely Success: Don’t Forget: the 
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in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and 1.7 million people lost their jobs 
in one quarter, the largest drop in employment in sixty-five years.135 The 
following day, Barclays announced an agreement to purchase Lehman 
Brothers’ North American investment banking and trading divisions along 
with its New York headquarters building, subject to regulatory approval.136 
On September 20, 2008, a revised version of that agreement was approved 
by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James M. Peck through a § 363 sale under the 
Code.137 
In contrast to the federal government’s position, other commentators 
argued that the bankruptcy process was the most effective and efficient way 
to unwind these large financial companies.138 They proposed that instead of 
a new insolvency regime, an additional section should be added to the Code 
that would specifically handle bank holding companies and nonbank 
financial companies.139 The proponents of the bankruptcy process argued 
that the Code “provides legal certainty, offering a large body of established 
jurisprudence,” predictability which encourages “risk-monitoring measures 
by creditors” thereby “reduc[ing] . . . moral hazard and . . . increas[ing] . . . 
market discipline,” a process for the “viability of an insolvent firm,” and 
“judicial review.”140  
Even with strong opposition to the creation of the OLA, the federal 
government viewed Lehman Brothers’ failure as an example of the 
inadequacies of the bankruptcy system.141 The crippling effects of the 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on the financial system appeared to solidify 
the Treasury Department’s opposition to the possibility of bankruptcy 
reform.142 The Treasury Department’s position was that bankruptcy 
proceedings would likely be too slow to respond, and a resolution regime 
must be more responsive.143 Following the Treasury Department’s position, 
Congress rejected bankruptcy reform, and instead established the OLA to 
wind down these institutions under Title II of Dodd-Frank.144 
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280 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 6 
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ORDERLY LIQUIDATION 
AUTHORITY 
Section 204 of Title II states that the purpose of the OLA is “to provide 
the necessary authority to liquidate failing financial companies that pose a 
significant risk to the financial stability of the United States in a manner 
that mitigates such risk and minimizes moral hazard.”145 Furthermore, the 
authority will be exercised in a manner whereby creditors, shareholders, and 
management “bear losses consistent with their responsibility, including 
actions for damages, restitution, and recoupment of compensation and other 
gains not compatible with such responsibility.”146 
Although §§ 204 and 206 are substantially similar, § 206 is slightly 
more detailed. Section 206 stipulates six mandatory terms and conditions 
for all orderly liquidation actions. First, it mandates that the FDIC will only 
take action for the financial stability of the United States, and not to bail out 
or rescue a particular failing financial company.147 Second, shareholders 
will be the last to receive payment after all other claims have been paid.148 
Third, unsecured creditors’ losses and payments, if any, will be made in 
accordance with the mandated priority provisions in § 210.149 Fourth, the 
FDIC, as receiver, will remove management of the failing financial 
company.150 Fifth, the FDIC will remove the board of directors of the 
failing financial company.151 Sixth, the FDIC cannot take an equity interest 
in or become a shareholder of a failing financial company. This provision 
was included to prevent another TBTF bailout.152  
In addition to the specific objectives set forth under Title II, there are 
general overarching goals of Dodd-Frank as well. The opening preamble of 
Dodd-Frank legislation states that it was enacted “[t]o promote the financial 
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency 
in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American tax-
payer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial ser-
vices practices, and for other purposes.”153 
C. THE FDIC’S POWERS AND DUTIES AS RECEIVER 
As receiver, the FDIC will have many powers to effectuate the goals of 
the OLA, including the ability to: “take over the assets of and operate the . . 
. [failing] company with all of the powers of the members or shareholders, 
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the directors, and the officers”;154 “collect all obligations and money 
owed”;155 “perform all functions of the covered financial company”;156 
“manage the assets and property” as to maximize asset value;157 and 
“provide by contract for assistance in fulfilling any function, activity, 
action, or duty of the [FDIC] as receiver.”158 The broad nature of these 
powers enables the FDIC to exercise wide discretion as to the managing 
and winding down of these financial companies.159 
These provisions are similar to certain provisions found in the FDIA.160 
Under the FDIA, the FDIC has the authority to continue operations after the 
closing of a failed depository institution if necessary to maximize the value 
of the assets in order to achieve the “least costly”161 resolution, or if 
necessary to prevent “serious adverse effects on economic conditions or 
financial stability.”162 Under the least costly requirement, other institutions 
will pay a premium to acquire the failed bank in order to obtain the 
sustained depositor relationships, thereby maximizing recoveries and 
minimizing losses.163  
In order to accomplish the OLA’s objectives, Dodd-Frank empowers 
the FDIC to treat creditors of the same class differently. Yet, the ability to 
treat creditors in the same class differently raises substantially the same 
concerns as the doctrine of necessity does in bankruptcy.164 To address 
similar concerns and minimize public uncertainty, the FDIC has sought to 
create more transparency, and used its authority under § 209 to promulgate 
a rule that would clarify the categories of creditors to which it may 
authorize additional payments;165 however, as this note points out, the FDIC 
did not go far enough.166 
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IV. CRITIQUE OF THE FDIC’S DECLARED TREATMENT OF 
CERTAIN UNSECURED CREDITORS 
The Final Rule excludes many types of unsecured creditors from 
receiving additional payments.167 As such, it distinguishes long-term 
unsecured debt from short-term unsecured debt, with the former being 
excluded.168 The FDIC did not exclude short-term debt creditors, such as 
commercial lenders, because those creditors can provide lines of credit and 
other forms of financing to the failing financial company. This financing 
can be critical to the company’s interim operation and orderly liquidation.169 
The FDIC can enforce lines of credit and agree to repay the lender under the 
credit agreement.170 Furthermore, lines of credit can be essential to help 
reduce funding requests from the Orderly Liquidation Fund (the Fund).171 
In addition, by distinguishing between long-term and short-term debt, 
the Final Rule seeks to achieve the goals of Dodd-Frank by creating more 
transparency to current and future creditors of potential failing financial 
companies, and maximizing asset value.172 Allocating additional payments 
to certain creditors that are critical to the business operation will allow the 
business to continue to the benefit of all creditors. Allowing the business to 
operate and continue provides the FDIC with the opportunity to wind down 
the business or sell certain assets of the company. A structured sale of an 
ongoing business would allow creditors, favored and disfavored, to receive 
more than they would in a Chapter 7 liquidation or a “fire sale” of assets 
that do not necessarily recover the going-concern value. 
Furthermore, long-term creditors are in a position to impose market 
discipline on a financial company.173 “[T]hese creditors do not share in the 
potential profits gained from engaging in risky activities,” and cannot “exit 
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quickly” if the company fails.174 Thus, they are incentivized to prefer more 
conservative investments.175 
In contrast, short-term creditors are more likely to engage in risky 
practices.176 This risky behavior has the ability to pose a significant threat to 
the financial system, while exacerbating moral hazard among short-term 
creditors if it remains unchecked.177 For example, in the financial context, 
moral hazard refers to the risk that creditors, shareholders, or investors of 
large financial institutions will take fewer precautions because they know 
they will be rescued or bailed out by the government.178 Having fewer 
precautions leads to risky behavior, which can lead to a systemic problem. 
In order to prevent systemic risk, however, regulators may need to rescue 
short-term creditors in order to prevent multiple failures throughout the 
market.179 Therefore, a government response “may contribute to the exact 
instability that government backing is trying to prevent.”180 While this note 
does not dispute the need to provide additional payments to creditors, which 
are necessary to the failing financial company, it does dispute the FDIC’s 
decision not to provide any framework or structure as to its exercise of 
discretion with regard to short-term creditors. Implementing a standard will 
convey a message to short-term creditors that the FDIC is unlikely to use its 
discretion unless it is of the utmost necessity. This will have the effect of 
reducing moral hazard, while still permitting the FDIC the ability to use its 
discretion in the event that systemic risk is a possibility.  
V. RECOMMENDATION 
Although the Final Rule is a step in the right direction by the FDIC to 
elucidate the categories of creditors that will be excluded from additional 
payments, it falls short, and further clarification is needed. The Final Rule 
failed to address how the FDIC will use its discretionary power regarding 
additional payments to short-term creditors, or creditors that were not 
automatically excluded.181 In the absence of any standard, the FDIC still has 
authority to exercise wide discretion to treat short-term creditors 
dissimilarly.182 This discretion presents the same dilemma that courts have 
debated when applying the doctrine of necessity: how is a critical vendor 
distinguishable from other creditors? 
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It is this note’s position that adopting a clear standard to determine a 
short-term creditor’s necessity will not only comply with the OLA’s stated 
objectives in a more effective manner, but will also allow the FDIC 
flexibility. The standards set forth in Kmart and CoServ present the optimal 
balance. In Kmart, the court highlighted essential factors that must be 
shown before a critical vendor payment may be allocated.183 First, the 
disfavored creditors will benefit from the payment of favored creditors 
because it will allow the business to continue; and second, the supposedly 
critical vendors would cease deliveries or supplies if pre-petition debt is not 
paid.184 Adopting similar reasoning, in CoServ, the court adopted a three-
pronged test that creates a clear standard which critical vendors must meet, 
including demonstrating the creditor’s indispensability to the debtor, the 
probable realization of economic gain, and a lack of practical 
alternatives.185 
Therefore, this note recommends the following standard be met before 
additional payment to a short-term creditor is made. First, the creditor must 
be virtually indispensible to the profitable operations or preservation of the 
value of the assets. Second, the creditor would discontinue business with 
the failing financial company if no additional payment is made. Third, 
creditor payment should either further the objectives of the OLA to 
maximize value or prevent serious economic harm to the distressed 
company. Lastly, no other practical alternatives are available other than 
payment to the certain creditor. 
This note’s standard in conjunction with the FDIC’s Final Rule will 
accomplish the mandated objectives of the OLA in the most effective 
manner for several reasons. First, the proposed standard is in accordance 
with the FDIC’s stated intent that the dissimilar treatment of creditors will 
only be exercised when it is necessary to maximize asset value.186 Only on a 
“case-by-case basis” will the payment of creditors be made, and in 
accordance with all statutory requirements.187 Implementing a standard to 
distinguish the necessary unsecured creditors from other unsecured 
creditors will accomplish this goal more effectively. By applying the 
proposed standard, it will further narrow the possibility of granting 
additional payments to creditors that are not necessary to maximize the 
value of the assets. 
Second, the implementation of a clear standard will create more 
transparency in the liquidation process, an overarching objective of the 
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legislation.188 In addition, it may alleviate concerns regarding the political 
aptitude of those exercising discretion and the administration that is in 
office at the time. 
Third, this note’s proposed standard will minimize moral hazard more 
effectively than the FDIC’s Final Rule. Without any clear standard that 
addresses the FDIC’s reluctance to grant additional payments to short-term 
creditors, these creditors may still engage in risky practices. If the proposed 
standard is implemented, however, they will be on notice that the FDIC’s 
authority will only be exercised in extreme cases. Thus, a rational creditor 
would not anticipate additional payments, and it would reduce moral 
hazard. Furthermore, putting forth a standard by which the FDIC will 
operate sends a strong message to the marketplace that additional payments 
will be a drastic measure, and not made regularly. This can reduce moral 
hazard and risk taking as well. One can argue that the recent downgrade by 
Moody’s of the long-term credit of Citigroup, Inc., Wells Fargo & Co., and 
Bank of America Corp. was an example of the effects that Dodd-Frank and 
FDIC regulations can have on the marketplace.189 Moody’s downgraded 
these banks because of an increased possibility that the government would 
allow these large financial institutions to fail, taking the view that contagion 
could be limited.190 The credit downgrade signifies that the anti-bailout 
position embraced under Dodd-Frank has affected at least one credit 
agency’s view as to the level of risk associated within these institutions.191 
A riskier investment is usually accompanied by increased costs, which can 
affect how other parties in the market interact with a specific company.192 
Although this note’s standard applies in most instances, there may be a 
limitation for a certain type of creditor that should be noted. Generally, un-
der the Code, contractual agreements that include provisions which allow a 
party to terminate the contract upon a debtor filing for bankruptcy or some 
other event related to the debtor’s financial condition are not enforceable 
and subject to the automatic stay.193 One exception to this rule is for a 
“qualified financial contract” (QFC), which is “any securities contract, 
commodity contract, forward contract, repurchase agreement, swap agree-
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ment, and any similar agreement.”194 Due to this exception, in a bankruptcy 
proceeding, a “non-defaulting QFC counterparty” can “close out, terminate, 
[or] net” their position, whether the trustee approves or not.195 The rationale 
for the QFC exception can be attributed to concerns over systemic risk and 
market uncertainty, thereby creating liquidity issues and contagion effects 
on the economy.196 Many large financial institutions (e.g., Lehman Broth-
ers) that invest heavily in “certain specialized markets for financial assets” 
have extensive QFC exposure.197 The deleterious consequence of this was 
exemplified when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and most of the 
counterparties to the QFCs terminated their contracts immediately upon the 
bankruptcy filing.198 Those terminations resulted in the loss of billions of 
dollars in market value to the bankruptcy estate almost instantaneously.199 
Although the QFC exemption was intended to prevent systemic risk, some 
commentators have argued that it actually increased systemic risk.200 They 
contend that the exemption alters the incentives so that counterparties do 
not monitor or impose discipline on the debtor, creating “counterparty runs” 
that have “spillover effects” on other creditors and the market as a whole.201 
In order to rectify this detrimental effect, Title II imposes a one-
business-day delay on all QFC terminations by counterparties.202 The pur-
pose of the one-business-day delay is to allow the FDIC to transfer assets, 
contracts, and other property of the failing company to another solvent 
company or to a newly created bridge financial company.203 By transferring 
the assets, counterparties cannot terminate their positions or contracts due to 
insolvency of the failing company as they did in the Lehman Brothers bank-
ruptcy.204 This prohibition is intended to provide “market certainty and sta-
bility” and, in the event of sale to a third party, “preserves the value 
represented by the contracts.”205  
In the event that the FDIC does not transfer assets of the failing finan-
cial company to either a third-party purchaser or a bridge financial compa-
ny, this note’s standard would be inapplicable. For instance, if neither trans-
fer happens within the one-business-day delay period, the “non-defaulting 
QFC counterparty . . . can take actions to exercise its contractual rights,” as 
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it did in Lehman Brothers.206 Therefore, it would not matter whether a stan-
dard had existed because the failing financial company would have little or 
no value remaining after the QFC counterparty terminates. Despite the pos-
sibility that the FDIC could fail to create a bridge company in time to pre-
vent QFC termination or facilitate a transfer to a new purchaser, it is doubt-
ful that this situation would occur. In fact, the FDIC already has this author-
ity under the FDIA, and orchestrated a similar transaction in 2008 with Indy 
Mac Bank, as a “pass-through conservatorship.”207  
In the likely event that the FDIC does form a bridge financial company, 
it could create more than one. For example, the FDIC could transfer all the 
assets and other property that can be sold to a third party into one company, 
which we shall call the “Good Bridge Company.”208 The FDIC could also 
create another bridge company, which we shall call the “Bad Bridge Com-
pany,” to which all liabilities and other defaulted obligations that cannot be 
sold will be transferred.209 Other possible bridge companies can be formed 
to hold all QFCs or other property. 
This note’s standard can be an effective mechanism whether the failing 
financial company’s property is transferred to the Good or Bad Bridge 
Company, but with varying effects. In a Good Bridge Company scenario, a 
central concern is to preserve a lasting relationship with a creditor so that 
the company can remain intact. Continued operations will have the effect of 
facilitating the maximization of asset value when it is sold to a third par-
ty.210 Yet, the issue that arises again is: are these creditors in fact necessary? 
Since the automatic stay would prohibit the cancellation of certain obliga-
tions, exclusive of QFCs, it may not be necessary to make prepayments be-
cause the receiver can determine whether to accept or reject certain con-
tracts.211 Even in a Bad Bridge Company scenario, the standard is useful 
because it also preserves the relationship of the creditors, especially when 
there are no contracts with creditors, but rather an open account relation-
ship. It would still be the goal of the receiver to sell these assets for some 
value, and paying certain short-term creditors may be the best way to max-
imize asset value.212 Thus, a standard to determine the necessity of these 
unsecured short-term creditors would still be beneficial and facilitate the 
process in either a Good or Bad Bridge Company situation. Furthermore, if 
a bridge company is created within the one-business-day delay period, all 
QFCs could be transferred, and the FDIC would afford the same discretio-
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nary treatment as it does to the other short-term unsecured creditors. Thus, 
this note’s standard would still apply. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Dodd-Frank, Congress has granted the FDIC wide discretion and 
authority as receiver under the OLA.213 In an effort to adhere to the OLA’s 
mandated objectives, the FDIC clarified how it would exercise its authority 
when granting additional payments to certain creditors over others of the 
same class.214 As this note argues, however, the FDIC only addresses half of 
the issue by failing to propose a standard that indicates its intended 
treatment toward short-term creditors. This note proposed a standard, which 
would further clarify the manner in which the FDIC would exercise its 
authority to treat short-term creditors differently by incorporating 
bankruptcy standards that have proven useful and effective.215 
Thus, this note recommends that the FDIC, in conjunction with the 
FSOC, propose a rule, which includes this note’s standard to address the 
FDIC’s treatment of short-term creditors under the OLA. Creating a clear 
standard to determine if a creditor is necessary will have the effect of 
promoting transparency within a recently created, and never before used, 
liquidation regime, minimizing moral hazard among short-term creditors, 
maximizing the assets of the failing financial company, harmonizing the 
OLA and existing insolvency regimes, and maintaining FDIC flexibility.216 
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